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Introduction 
 
In 2005 SNV Netherlands Development Organisation celebrated its 40th birthday. 
This was felt to be an appropriate occasion to conduct in-depth research into the 
socio-cultural history of the organization. The African Studies Centre in Leiden, The 
Netherlands was commissioned to carry out the study, while having a free hand in 
formulating the questions and carrying out the research. The results of this research 
were published under the title: Bricks, mortar and capacity building. A socio-cultural 
history of SNV Netherlands Development Organisation (Brill 2010).  
 The sources for the study were formed by archival documents and interviews 
conducted in various countries. Obviously it was impossible to carry out interviews in 
all countries where SNV had had activities during its history. Therefore seven 
countries were chosen, on the basis of a range of criteria. Not only had SNV to be 
present for considerable time in the country, for logistical reasons a current presence 
in the country. Given the preponderance of African-based activities and the expertise 
within the African Studies Centre in Leiden, five countries in Africa were selected. In 
an effort to achieve geographical and linguistic diversity, the choice was finally made 
as follows: Guinea Bissau, Mali, Cameroon, Tanzania and Zambia. In Latin America 
and Asia, Bolivia and Nepal were selected. A commissioned local researcher 
conducted interviews in these countries, studied the archival material available and 
wrote an essay on SNV’s history in the country concerned on the basis of what they 
had heard and read.  
 We feel that these reports merit more attention than functioning as source 
material for the Bricks, mortar and capacity building publication. It is for this reason 
that as African Studies Centre we make the African case studies available for a larger 
audience in the form of a working paper.  
 Each commissioned researcher was asked to carry out research with the 
following questions in mind: 
- What were SNV employees’ intentions and expectations, and how do they 
look back on their activities? 
- What were the expectations of the communities in which SNV was active and 
how are SNV activities now evaluated by people from these communities? 
 
With these basic questions the researchers read archival documents and conducted 
interviews with (former) SNV workers and with people who had been in contact with 
the organization. 
 
Inge Brinkman 
Leiden, July 2011 
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A History of SNV from a Zambian Perspective 
1965-2005 
 
Marja Hinfelaar1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This study is based on the assumption that international lending institutions and 
NGOs did not shape the history of Zambia despite the definite influence they had on 
the country. From this premise, the history of SNV in Zambia might be expected to 
mirror the socio-economic and political developments of Zambia.1 However if we 
want to see the SNV from a local perspective, we have to understand the target group 
and what the local perception of development work was when the SNV arrived in 
Zambia in 1965. How did changes in government policy and ideology over a period of 
40 years affect SNV? And if SNV’s goal was to empower Zambians with skills or 
‘capacity’, to what extent did the local socio-economic and political situation allow 
for this? The history of SNV has, therefore, been divided into the following periods 
and themes: development projects prior to independence (1945-1964); the rise of a 
new nation (1964-1972); the nationalisation process and the one-party state (1973-
1991); and the liberalisation of the political economy from 1991 onwards. By way of 
conclusion, the long-term consequences of SNV’s activities in Zambia are explored. 
This study is based on archival research, interviews, fieldwork and secondary 
literature in Zambia.2 
 
 
‘Progressive Men’: Introducing the Concept of Development Work in 
Colonial Times (1945-1964)3 
 
It has been suggested that the initiation of development projects by the British 
colonial government was motivated by political expediency, namely to counteract the 
growth of nationalist movements.4 Another of the colonial government’s concerns 
was to encourage people living in the urban areas to return to the land because the 
absence of young men in the rural areas was resulting in a severe shortfall in 
agricultural output in areas with high labour migrancy rates. 
Kenneth Kaunda, Zambia’s first president after independence, was one of the 
most enthusiastic believers in this development ideology. As chairperson of Chinsali 
Young Men’s Farming Association in the 1950s, he was part of a group that engaged 
in and contributed to an emerging discourse of development and progress in the 
1950s. They genuinely identified with and saw their interests lying within the colonial 
government’s post-war development strategy.5 For these young, relatively well-
educated men, development projects opened up new avenues for social mobility that 
were independent of the traditional authorities.  
Government policy focused on encouraging successful farming by introducing 
the African Improved Farmers’ Scheme and Peasant Farmers’ Programme in 
productive areas like Central, Eastern and Southern Province. However, these projects 
affected less than 5% of farmers.6 In less-productive areas, like Northern Province, the 
                                                 
1 National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka: http://www.zambiarchives.org/  
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programmes established large farming ‘blocks’, consisting of land, housing and 
implements. These types of government-led development projects failed for the 
simple reason that farming could not compete with a career in town. The government 
soon realised that the potential market for agricultural products within the area was 
limited and transport costs were too high to allow for the export of produce outside 
the area. Ironically, despite the economic and political failure of these projects, the 
development concept provided the British government with a way of remaining 
involved in Zambia after it had achieved political independence. Post-colonial 
development aid to former colonies gave the British ‘a continued sense of their 
mission in shaping their future’.7  
The colonial government did not have a monopoly on development projects 
and throughout Zambia missionaries of all denominations engaged in education, 
healthcare and agricultural projects. While women received basic education and 
instruction in health and nutrition, the missionaries expected progressive change to 
come from the young men and, as a result, they became the focal point of training 
schemes. From the 1950s onwards, youth movements like the Dutch Katholieke 
Arbeiders Jeugd (popularly known as Kajotters) assisted the missionaries in the 
construction of schools, hospitals and churches.8 
 
 
A Young Man’s Nation: The Politics of Development (1964-1972) 
 
Aiding Zambia, which was a rich country in many ways, was a political decision. 
With a 12% annual growth rate and high copper prices, Zambia did not need outside 
assistance. In fact in the First National Development Plan, aid amounted to less than 
0.8% of the budget (of which 0.4% was actually received).9 Wood and Vokes suggest 
the following reasons as to why Zambia received such favourable treatment from 
donor organisations: the shortage of technical personnel; a dangerously narrow 
economic base; and a dualist economy with extensive rural poverty. An additional 
reason was Zambia’s position as a front-line state.10 
President Kaunda was under a lot of pressure. Huge investments were needed 
in the educational and healthcare sectors to provide services for the whole population 
and, as a result, public expenditure rose by 20% a year between 1965 and 1970. 
Politically, Kaunda had to create unity out of a diverse and split country. High 
expectations of independence, a scramble for political positions, high urban 
unemployment rates and the resulting tensions posed a serious threat to Kaunda’s rule. 
One way of countering these problems was the ‘back to the land’ policy that was used 
as a means of providing employment and controlling the youth. But despite the 
tensions, it was a time of optimism.11 Like other developing countries, Zambia 
believed the development orthodoxy ‘that foreign aid and investment on favourable 
terms, the transfer of knowledge of production techniques, measures to promote 
health and education and economic planning would lead impoverished countries to be 
able to become “normal” market economies’.12  
 
 
SNV Projects 
 
This is the background against which SNV officially arrived in Zambia in 1965. A 
contract between the Dutch Embassy and the Zambian government set out the aims of 
this cooperation. 
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Under the Netherlands Youth Volunteer Programme and within the limits imposed by 
the availability of manpower and financial and material resources, the Netherlands 
government shall place Netherlands volunteers at the disposal of the Zambian 
government upon the request of the latter. [author’s emphasis] 
 
The objective of the programme was ‘to help train staff by co-operating with the 
intermediate and lower categories of staff in Zambia’.13 Dutch development assistance 
was clearly aimed at poor subsistence farmers, following the ideal of reducing 
regional welfare inequalities. As a result, SNV mainly focused its activities in 
Western, North-Western and Luapula Provinces. By contrast, organisations like the 
European Union (which was set up later) and the World Bank opted to back ‘high 
return’ provinces like Southern and Eastern Provinces.14 
SNV’s approach to development work meant that its activities in the early 
period were seen as having a pioneer spirit and of being of ‘bricks and mortar’.15 In 
1966, nine Dutch agricultural advisors arrived to assist the Zambian government with 
the implementation of its new agricultural policy. The majority of these volunteers 
were attached to the recently established Zambia Youth Service camps in Katete, 
Solwezi, Kabwe and Kitwe and while the aim of these camps was to train the youth to 
become farmers, it soon became clear that the ulterior motive was to enlist them into 
the UNIP youth movement. A number of former volunteers attest to this: 
 
The youth of the Zambia Youth Service were actually campaign leaders, who would 
enter the villages to force people to vote for Kaunda’s UNIP party. The government 
promised to reward them for carrying out this work.16 
 
In response, SNV tried to remain politically neutral. 
 
SNV adjusted itself to the politics of the moment, as it continues to do. SNV cannot 
influence politics, so they grabbed every opportunity to start a project... SNV’s drive 
was to set up as many projects as possible in Zambia and one can only achieve this by 
abiding by politics.17 
 
SNV was forced to impose limits. When these youth service camps ‘became a semi-
military organisation’, SNV pulled out18 and volunteers were moved to other 
projects.19 An additional reason for abandoning these camps was a clash of ideologies 
– SNV’s adherence to the ideal of small-scale farming as opposed to the UNIP’s 
determination to introduce large-scale mechanised farming.20 In 1968, SNV policy 
focused on integrated rural development, supplying agricultural, health and 
educational services to certain areas in Luapula, North-Western and Central 
Provinces. 
This type of integrated development was initiated in 1967 by a group of 
volunteers attached to a resettlement scheme in Kasempa. The ‘Rural Training Team’ 
consisted of an agriculturalist, a domestic-science worker, a builder, a nurse, a 
midwife and a team leader. They soon realised that ‘the population in the area tried to 
keep aloof from too much interference by the government, and it was envisaged that a 
non-government team might make contact with the people more readily and would 
inspire confidence’.21 Another example of an integrated SNV project was in Monze in 
Southern Province where the SNV cooperated with the Roman Catholic Church 
instead of the Zambian government. Monze diocese at the time needed volunteers in 
the fields of agriculture, education and healthcare and received several through SNV. 
 8
One SNV volunteer set up a midwifery training programme at Monze hospital in the 
early 1970s. Having married locally, she continued to work part-time at the same 
institute until the late 1980s. Despite numerous clashes between SNV and diocesan 
staff on religious grounds, the diocese provided a tightly organised structure for the 
volunteers to work in.22 
As a result of the growing number of volunteers, from an initial nine in 1965 
to 45 in 1971,23 it was felt that more coordination was needed. This led to the 
establishment of an SNV field office in Zambia and the introduction of a certain 
hierarchy. The first SNV field director was Wim Zevenbergen, an ex-colonial officer 
who had worked in the former Dutch colony of New Guinea. Half of the SNV 
volunteers were nurses and health workers, all of whom were professional women 
with an average age of about 30. By contrast, the male volunteers – working in Youth 
Service Camps or providing the government with technical assistance – were in their 
early twenties. An explanation for this discrepancy could be the fact that men had to 
fulfil their military service obligations the moment they finished their studies. 
Working for SNV for a period of three years was considered a valid alternative by the 
Dutch government.24 
To realise the scale of SNV operations, one has to put its contribution in 
perspective. British Aid, for instance, recruited 3049 technical assistants at its height 
in 1970.25 Other organisation included the Peace Corps and voluntary organisations 
from Denmark, Germany, Canada and Norway. In areas where many organisations 
operated it is doubtful whether the local population would have been able to 
differentiate between them. While singing the praises of some and condemning others, 
a nun remembers volunteers ‘who spent the whole night in bars and one group had a 
car accident because they were racing each other. I am not sure whether that were 
Dutch volunteers or other nationalities.’26 
 
 
Personal Experiences and Zambian Responses 
 
Neither the SNV volunteers nor the Zambians can be described as homogenous 
groups of people. Their encounters were therefore not only a clash of cultures but also 
a meeting of different generations, backgrounds and, of course, characters. Their 
experiences also depended on the location: some volunteers were stationed in remote 
parts of the country where no English was spoken; others worked in town where 
educational levels were higher. SNV volunteers might have been convinced of their 
mission when leaving their homelands but many started to have doubts when faced 
with the complex reality on the ground in Zambia. While expecting to find an 
‘extremely primitive society’, as the Dutch ambassador at the time put it, many 
volunteers expressed surprise at the existence of a ‘proper economy’, which 
convinced many to settle and start their own business.27 
The preparatory courses the volunteers received in the Netherlands prior to 
their departure did not adequately prepare them for the cultural clash. A missionary 
priest who went through the same experience expressed it as follows: ‘We were not 
properly prepared to work with people who had totally different customs, habits and 
religious beliefs What did we know about cultures? In our minds culture was related 
to the arts. For us there was only one way of living, namely the western way. Other 
parts of the world were underdeveloped.’28 Most volunteers at this time were young 
and had never travelled outside Europe before going to Zambia. They had to adapt to 
a simple lifestyle in Zambia: they slept in caravans or huts, drove old cars and 
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received only a modest income. For some it was a vocation, they were not motivated 
by a big salary, for others it was an adventure or a way of avoiding military service in 
the Dutch army.29  
All the volunteers agreed that their behaviour could easily have irked 
Zambians. The bluntness and disdain shown for the local culture and beliefs could 
easily have led to conflict. Some noted a level of resistance against their interventions. 
 
I used to visit villages of the employees I was working with on the [SNV] project. 
Once I came to a village and ended up with someone I get along very well at work. 
But when I came to him he said: you are allowed to come, you are welcome, but I 
don’t want you to try to change my village. That’s what we do on the project, but not 
where I live. 30 
 
Looking back on the experience, former volunteers wonder how Zambians were able 
to accept a situation in which a young and inexperienced volunteer was managing a 
farm employing 400 labourers.31 Conflicts occurred but rarely got out of hand. It 
remained at the level of small disputes, like ‘sometimes we were reproached for 
having passed a village elder accidentally and not offering a lift’.32 One volunteer, 
however, was asked to leave SNV after hitting a man who had stolen his bicycle.33  
Meetings called by SNV were generally well attended by the local population, 
but the volunteers realised that an ulterior motive for their coming could have been 
‘an element of curiosity, to listen to the new (white) inhabitants, and also the 
opportunity to express many complaints’.34 In this context the long-standing colonial 
legacy of the image of Europeans cannot be dismissed. Inevitably, SNV volunteers 
were associated with former colonial civil servants or commercial farmers and were 
considered wealthy: 
 
Zambians did not see the difference between us SNV volunteers and the former 
colonials. If you arrive there as a young bloke and you drive a big Land Rover and 
can buy whatever you want, even though you were only earning 10 pounds a month, 
but you could declare these costs. You could do whatever you wanted, somebody was 
cooking and washing for you, so in the eyes of the local population it did not matter 
who you were. They looked at us as ‘oh, there goes a white person’. You shouldn’t 
have the illusion that they thought we were different from the white farmers, really 
not. This led to discussions but tensions too.35 
 
It is interesting to note that conflicts between SNV and the local population always 
revolved round a vehicle. Vehicles became the icons of development work. Many 
villagers and provincial town people only knew SNV because of the cars that passed 
by, which could be few and far between. The vehicles created the impression of 
wealth and status. A Catholic missionary recalls that in the early 1970s it was widely 
believed that the compensation for a ‘SNV pregnancy’ (when a local girl became 
pregnant by an SNV volunteer) was shaped in the form of a second-hand Toyota 
High-Lux.36 Project vehicles directly benefited the local population as they could 
carry the sick to hospital, transport goods and help with shopping. Most volunteers 
however did not appreciate the idea of merely being a ‘taxi driver’. 37 
 
As a result of all these new experiences, SNV volunteers formed a close-knit 
organisation, likened to a family, and the coordinators played a parental role. 
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When Wim Zevenbergen was around and you were visiting Lusaka, it was normal 
that you would join him at church on Sunday. Even if you were not a churchgoer, you 
joined him and afterwards you would have a cup of coffee at his home. This was 
stronger in the early years than later. The first groups were closer. Sint Nicolas was 
celebrated amongst the groups at a provincial level.38 
 
Another comparison of the spirit of SNV was that of an old-fashioned scout 
movement. The Dutch Farm, the administrative and recreational SNV centre situated 
10 km west of Lusaka, was the volunteers’ first port of call in Zambia and was 
extremely bare, reminiscent of a boarding school. On arrival, some SNV volunteers 
felt as if they were being treated as minors despite the fact that some of them were in 
their late twenties.39 Given the SNV tendency to interfere in volunteers’ social lives, 
this sentiment comes as no surprise. At this stage, relationships between volunteers 
and the local population were forbidden: at least one female volunteer who married 
locally was asked to leave the organisation.40 Another SNV couple who decided to get 
married needed special permission for the wife to continue her work: ‘We were the 
first volunteers who got married and my wife really wanted to continue to work. We 
asked why this would be possible. Eventually a specific arrangement was put in place 
... Even the Board in the Netherlands had to decide on this matter.’41 SNV changed 
this policy in the next period. 
 
 
Zambianisation and the Paradox of Dependency (1973-1991) 
 
In 1973 Zambia was pronounced a one-party state with the ruling UNIP in full control 
of the economy and politics. Socialism became the official state ideology. These 
political changes coincided with a period of economic decline as a result of the 
worldwide oil crisis, a fall in the price of copper, and Zambia’s support to the regional 
liberation wars. Zambia became more dependent on foreign aid. By 1979, Zambia, 
despite being the seventh richest of the thirty-nine states in Sub-Saharan Africa, was 
receiving the tenth largest amount of aid per capita.42 In the Netherlands, Zambia 
enjoyed favoured nation status. Donors implemented programmes with a view to 
lessening dependency on copper and to counteracting a growing wealth gap between 
the urban and rural populations. As a result, from 1977 onwards the agricultural sector 
received more funding than the educational sector.43 Technical assistance grew to 
5.3% of the government’s budget in 1975 and to 8.5% in 1979.44 Foreign aid was by 
then accounting for 65% of the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development’s 
budget.45 The tight budget led to the collapse of government-run projects like the 
provincial farming training centres, while ‘aid-backed projects continued and foreign 
aid emerged in dominant position’.46 Most donors supported so-called Integrated 
Rural Development projects, with the Dutch government specialising in dairy and 
cattle production. Calls for improved coordination of development efforts led to the 
introduction of the National Commission for Development Planning, with 
representations at provincial and district levels. In North-Western and Western 
Provinces aid now exceeded 50% of government spending.47 As Gould observed, 
UNIP’s ambitious rural development policies imploded in the late 1980s under the 
weight of a complex package of unsustainable subsidies to seed and fertiliser 
distributors, to commodity producers, to grain transporters, to milling companies, to 
urban consumers and so on.48 
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SNV Projects 
 
SNV’s rural-based activities fitted well in this view of development aid and, as a 
result, few policy changes occurred in the 1970s. It was a period of shared 
‘revolutionary zeal’ with the socialist government. SNV accepted projects outside the 
three provinces but stopped its activities in Central Province. SNV health workers 
were no longer needed in hospitals as a result of the process of Zambianisation and 
medical volunteers instead worked on the newly established mother and childcare 
projects in the rural health centres or at specialised health institutions. In 1979, SNV 
had 54 people in the field; half of whom were engaged in healthcare, the other half in 
agriculture.49 Cooperation with Monze Diocese continued. 
 
As Zambia’s economy continued its rapid decline, with high inflation and shortages of 
all products, SNV’s idealism slowly ebbed away, along with its perception of the task 
of development. 
 
At the time SNV was very idealistic, as in: ‘let’s just help here and change matters 
around.’ This is something you start doing at the local level. But I think that SNV 
realised in the course of time that it might be better to work more structurally and at a 
higher level. Through government or NGOs.50 
 
Of course, the change from SNV’s grassroots involvement to support for district or 
provincial government institutions was also a result of the large-scale investment in 
education. Zambians were now in a position to take over the work at a micro level and 
were encouraged to do so by government and donor organisations. Expatriate 
development workers had to climb the ladder and become ‘experts’ and be more 
‘professional’. However, it seems that this change did not happen overnight. When 
Muyoyeta started working for SNV in 1985 she observed the following: 
 
At that time SNV was just sending volunteers, mostly to work with the government. I 
remember there were a lot of physiotherapists, a lot of people in agriculture, working 
with the Ministry of Agriculture – planning officers, land surveyors, those kinds of 
people. Most of them were doing that. Outside of government they were working 
with youth projects, carpentry projects for youth and that kind of thing. That tended to 
be mainly what their work was about.51 
 
In fact, some cynical Zambians argued that SNV volunteers became professionals in 
name only. One highly educated Zambian commented on SNV’s professionalism in 
the 1990s: ‘The behaviour was that of a voluntary organisation and their type of 
recruiting was also of volunteers.’52 
 
From the mid-1980s onwards, SNV cooperated with the Dutch Embassy (DGIS) on a 
number of large-scale projects, some of which lasted until the late 1990s. DGIS was 
the funding agency and SNV acted as its executive. In all these projects, SNV worked 
in close cooperation with local government departments. The Dutch government did 
not change its policy regarding assistance to the poorest areas and remained active in 
Western, North-Western and Luapula Provinces. A new and important trend was 
SNV’s support for district councils. Like British Aid and other organisations, SNV 
saw the need to assist the administrative decentralisation process at district level. They 
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did so by attaching advisors to district councils, with the aim of improving planning 
capacities and managing their income more efficiently.53  
SNV was not alone in its endeavours, as it belonged to a group of 26 donor 
agencies that were active in Zambia’s agricultural sector with a total number of 160 
projects between them. The danger of scattered development projects, it was later 
recognised, was an increase in regional disparities and there was the risk of thwarting 
‘future attempts to develop coherent, national, rural and development planning’.54 As 
discussed earlier, the large number of projects was bound to confuse the local 
population. An American anthropologist based in Mwinilunga observed the following 
in the 1980s: 
  
Nearly every year some new group, full of enthusiasm, arrives with new projects 
aimed at improving social and economic conditions. During my initial periods of field 
research (1982, 1984-1987), the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), 
Norwegian Agency for International Development (NORAD), the German Assistance 
to Zambia Program (GTZ), the British Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO), the 
Belgian and French group Medicins sans Frontières (MSF), the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), the World Health Organisation (WHO), 
international Catholic and Protestant relief agencies, local missionary groups, plus 
various agencies of the national government each had projects in place.55 
 
To give an impression of SNV’s activities during this period, selected projects are 
summarised below. 
 
Rural Water for Health Project, North-Western Province  
 
After a prolonged drought in North-Western Province in the early 1980s, the Dutch 
government introduced a large-scale project to provide wells and boreholes to a 
number of districts in the province. The aim of the programme changed from drought 
contingency to the following: 
 
To provide safe and adequate drinking water and sanitation facilities with the aim to 
improve the health and living conditions of the rural population in above districts, in a 
manner which will allow the cost for operation and maintenance to be afforded by the 
community.56 
 
Between 1985 and 1990 a total of 108 boreholes were drilled in Kasempa and Solwezi 
Districts. When the first phase of the project came to the end it met with the following 
criticism from DGIS. 
 
It has to be admitted that after the not-so-successful first phase, where the emphasis 
lay on the physical construction of the infrastructure, a proposal has been submitted in 
which community participation (aimed mainly at maintenance) will be encouraged as 
well as additional activities such as training and health education. The project may 
continue but must be closely monitored.57 
 
This project is a good case of one in which SNV shifted over time from practical 
assistance – namely drilling boreholes – to offering advisory services. The drilling of 
boreholes continued but the emphasis was now on the sustainability of the project and 
how to organise people and government departments in such a way that they would be 
able to look after the boreholes and wells once SNV handed them over. While 
admiring its concept, it was later criticised for its top-down approach. ‘There is no 
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discussion of whether this pattern is viewed as suitable by the community, or whether 
any other management structure could be more effective, and might require fewer 
inputs to keep it functioning’.58 The local communities, however, did pick up on the 
idea and ‘contributed food for the workers, sand, stones, so they felt it was their well 
because they contributed a lot to it’.59 
 
Masase Agricultural Project (MAP), Western Province 
 
In the late 1970s, the Zambian government initiated Cattle Development Area projects 
to increase national food production, promote self-sufficiency and improve the 
income of rural households. The EU, and the German and Dutch governments 
supported this move.  
In this context, the Masase Cattle Development Area was established in 1982 
in Sesheke District. The project did not make a big impact due to the limited funds 
made available to it by the Provincial Capital Budget. It was also recognised that there 
was a need to consolidate the existing project activities that had already been started 
and to expand into areas that were not yet covered. All of this required an increased 
budget and inputs. In 1986 support was secured from DGIS for a period of four 
years.60 SNV was the executive agency and appointed several SNV staff members to 
the projects. The activities shifted from cattle towards an ‘integrated comprehensive 
approach’ in agricultural development. The Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, 
managed the programme through its National Agricultural Area Development 
Steering Committee.61 The project came to be known as the Masase Agricultural 
Project (MAP). 
 
Fisheries Projects, Luapula Province 
 
In 1986, the World Bank released a report on Zambia’s fisheries sector and offered 
support for a four-year project aimed at the rehabilitation of the ice plant in 
Kashikishi, a stock assessment survey of Lake Mweru and services to the local fishing 
communities. But Zambia’s break with the IMF in 1987 led to the downscaling of the 
project and the Dutch government agreed to adopt parts of it. The project’s overall 
aim was to help fishermen to increase their standard of living by providing a market in 
Luapula Province sp that they did not have to transport fish themselves.  
The ice plant, managed by the Luapula Co-operative Union (ZCU) was 
rehabilitated with the assistance of SNV. Other activities included support to the 
Luapula fisheries sector by gaining knowledge about fish stocks. SNV soon realised 
the need to expand its focus on integrated activities, for example, to encourage 
fishermen to engage in alternative activities during a fishing ban. These were 
implemented in the next period.  
 
Provincial and District Planning Unit, Luapula Province 
 
Provincial Planning Units (PPU) were established from 1980 to 1982 as part of the 
government’s decentralisation programme. The SNV programme supporting these 
PPUs was formulated as follows: ‘to improve absorptive capacity to implement 
projects, need for productive and income-generating projects, need to actively 
formulate projects for funding, rational exploitation of natural resources, promotion of 
women integration’. SNV assisted the government in integrating development 
departments at district level and introduced a section called Women’s Affairs within 
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the PPU. The vision of the Women’s Affairs section was ‘to promote the integration 
of women in the development of the province’. This section opened in Mansa in April 
1990 and was headed by the coordinator for women’s affairs, assisted by an SNV 
advisor.62 Unusually, this proposal was evaluated by a Zambian professional, 
employed by SNV, who expressed a word of caution concerning SNV’s involvement 
in councils:  
 
Councils are historically, local administration and social services provision 
institutions with no development attitude towards productive projects. Development 
planning is not contained in the Local Government Act of 1980 … in order to involve 
the personnel and political structure at the district level, they [the old guard] need to 
be motivated as a whole to appreciate the changing role of District Councils. This is 
possibly quite involving.63 
 
Cooperation with councils, however, remained a permanent feature of SNV activities 
in Luapula Province. 
 
Zambezi Cooperative and Agricultural Project (ZCAP), North-Western Province  
 
In 1985, SNV started a small agricultural credit scheme in Zambezi District to provide 
financial and advisory support geared towards an ‘integrated farm approach’. After 
the first evaluation it was proposed to start a regional development programme for the 
district aimed at increasing production, the promotion of self-sustained development 
and the improvement of living conditions.64 In 1989, the Netherlands Embassy 
expressed serious doubts about the economic viability of the project: ‘[it] should be 
turned into an economically viable trading company, rather than a farmers’ “welfare 
organisation”‘. However, because of the involvement of other parties, like the district 
agricultural officer and the district veterinary officer, DGIS agreed to provide funding 
for a period of one year to redirect the project.65 SNV played a coordinating role in 
this.  
 
Tonga Museum and Crafts Project, Choma, Southern Province 
 
A small programme carried out by the Ministry of Agriculture in conjunction with 
Gossner Mission in Gwembe Valley had an unexpected outcome: a unique collection 
of Tonga artefacts. Despite the fact that this project was situated outside their 
concentration area, SNV adopted the project, realising that in addition to the value of 
the preservation of culture, the production of artefacts created an important source of 
income for rural households. SNV provided personal assistance to the project in the 
form of a curator and project manager, with DGIS funding this large-scale project 
under the Rural Development Programme.66 Uniquely, the same SNV advisor 
managed the project for its entire duration from 1988 to 1997. 
 
 
Personal Experiences and Zambian Responses 
 
Until the introduction of project aid and professionalisation in the mid-1980s, SNV 
volunteers continued to work as their predecessors had done. As a result, the 
characteristics of SNV volunteers were no different from those of the early volunteers. 
They were young and inexperienced in development work and in general did not have 
a university degree. But there were some differences. Thus SNV changed its policy 
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regarding the relationship between SNV volunteers and the local population: every 
volunteer now carried a box of condoms from the Netherlands.67 It also became 
possible to be recruited as a couple. In 1979, the first Dutch family arrived in Zambia 
with their two children.68  
Idealism was still a strong factor. As one volunteer commented: ‘It was from 
that time, the idealism of the 1970s. I don’t think people have that any more.’69 SNV, 
which valued the Dutch inspraak cultuur (the right to have your say), had long and 
serious discussions on almost everything. One of the most remarkable points of debate 
was whether volunteers ought to give part of their ‘excess’ salary back to SNV.70 
Another discussion, related to ‘luxuries’, was the issue of housing: should volunteers 
live in brick houses or in thatched huts, like the local population? SNV did not 
intervene in these discussions and people made their own individual choices. 
Even if volunteers lived a simple lifestyle, the language barrier and differences 
in educational levels still created a gap between the local population and the 
volunteers. 
 
The farmers with whom you cooperated hardly spoke English. The contact you had 
with those people was very, I believe, quite superficial. Socially, the people you 
interacted with at the weekend, were often business people or people from the 
educational sector. They were at a certain level which you could more easily relate 
to.71 
 
Despite all their preparations at home, volunteers struggled with cultural differences. 
One of those was the issue of time-keeping and, related to that, taking time to 
socialise. 
 
And the time they take for greetings. That’s a whole exchange: how are you and your 
children and your chickens and the weather, etc. After five minutes you’re still not 
finished. We come to someone and say: you have to buy fertiliser and this is the cost. 
That’s a message of one minute and then you want to be off again.72 
 
When language proved not to be the barrier, there were other differences to overcome. 
As one former SNV nurse commented: ‘We are trained to be preventive, they are 
much more curative. In the beginning we worked in a health centre and the girls 
prescribed all kinds of things [medicines] while I thought it wasn’t necessary. 
Schoolchildren who came with headache and coughs, but just wanted to avoid going 
to school… But you couldn’t do anything because you were the guest in the 
country.’73  
Some volunteers adapted easily to the local culture while others firmly resisted 
it. There was an instance where one volunteers after a long trip to meet up with a 
group of farmers arrived to find them drinking beer. ‘I got very angry and said “that’s 
not what I came here to do” and they would say “yes, but your predecessor would join 
us and drink beer with us the whole day!” I made it clear that I had not come for 
that.’74 
The SNV volunteers in the late 1970s and 1980s arrived in a country that was 
much less carefree than it had been in the early days. As a result of economic decline 
and regional liberations, wars, tensions and shortages affected the daily lives of the 
volunteers: ‘It was actually not a nice period when we came. It was socialist, and there 
were a few state-owned shops where you could buy your toothpaste. There was no 
toilet paper, no flour, and no bread. It was a difficult time. The borders with 
Zimbabwe were closed, South Africa was boycotted… The atmosphere was actually 
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not good. If you were white you were under suspicion. You were seen as a [South 
African or Rhodesian] spy.’75  
 
In the mid-1980s many changes took place within SNV Zambia as a result of the 
introduction of project aid and other policy changes. Volunteers were slowly replaced 
by university-trained development workers.76 The new SNV employees had often 
gained experience in other developing countries. Salaries and housing conditions were 
adjusted. Inevitably, this also heralded the end of the ‘Dutch farm’ as a meeting point. 
The old meeting centre was exchanged for a modest office in Chachacha Road in 
Lusaka in a deal with the Zambia Council for Social Development.  
Perhaps as a result of the professionalisation of development work, SNV 
became more ‘trendy’. Introducing new development concepts from outside seemed 
to cause a top-down approach. The introduction of the hugely complex concept of 
gender is one such example. An SNV employee specialised in gender immediately on 
arrival dismissed the most popular form of cooperation, the women’s clubs:  
 
In Zambia the club approach is very widespread, whereby the clubs are supposed to 
be representing the women. However, clubs include disproportionate numbers of 
slightly better-off women, usually married, who can afford the luxury of time off for 
child-care, domestic and agricultural responsibilities. 77 
 
One would imagine some sort of resistance to this type of judgement but her 
counterpart at the council later commented on the cooperation as having been 
positive. ‘She was very patient and imparted the skills and everything went well so 
that at the end of the contract we were very competent.’78 This poses the question of 
whether people accepted the new concept because they were convinced of its use or 
simply because it was on offer. This issue has led to considerable debate. It is 
obvious, as Frederick Cooper suggests, that gender programmes risk being used ‘only 
as an ‘add on’ to a development process otherwise unchanged’.79 A Zambian gender 
specialist hired by SNV for a gender assessment of the Rural Water for Health 
Programme agreed with Cooper’s observation:  
 
If RWHP had chosen to focus on gender, it would have meant creating a programme 
that would aim at altering the power imbalance process. The Project would have 
found that it gets drawn into work processes that challenge, criticize, question, 
identify and scrutinise systems and structures with the main aim of seeing positive 
change. Whether this change be radical or otherwise. Most of these systems and 
structures are government. This type of work is political.80 
 
In the same context, evaluators wondered if ‘it would be of interest to find out how 
women, who have always been the custodians of traditional water resources, view the 
change of role when the protected sources are introduced, along with its somewhat 
cumbersome management structure’.81 
Another such concept, which was somewhat forced, was ownership and 
sustainability. The answer of one villager, a beneficiary of Rural Water of Health 
Project after he has been asked whether he had heard of SNV is telling. 
 
SNV was not known, they didn’t want people to know that the RWHP was part of a 
project like SNV. They wanted the community to feel responsible for the wells... we 
don’t know SNV as an organization. We just know RWHP .82 
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Development work became a specialisation and career opportunity for Zambians. The 
first Zambian professional joined SNV in 1985. She was a well-known activist and 
the head of a large women’s organisation at the same time and joined SNV as a 
graduate fresh from university. In the midst of all the policy changes regarding 
professionalisation and the recruitment of Zambians, she has the distinct impression 
that SNV was in flux then. 
 
Why do I say SNV wasn’t ready for me? There were a lot of issues around what 
conditions of service I should be offered. Was I volunteer, should I to be offered 
volunteer conditions of service? That kind of thing. There was a lot going backwards 
and forwards about my conditions of service and what I should get and what I 
shouldn’t get. My conditions were very different from the Dutch conditions. … it was 
a genuine attempt to get a Zambian in, to begin to get a Zambian perspective into the 
organisation. Whereas I think, before the organisation was a little bit closed, a very 
tight-knit organisation. Very focused on itself and what it did.83 
 
Other Zambians employed by SNV were drivers who were mostly attached to the 
large projects. The Zambian support staff was the most permanent factor in the 
organisation and as a result these people saw many SNV people and projects come 
and go. The longest-serving driver comments on adjusting to the Dutch culture in 
daily encounters. 
  
For Zambians it is a strange thing to call each other by the first name. But in Europe it 
is how you are supposed to call each other. So I used to say ‘mister Roy’ at the 
beginning, and he told me: ‘stop calling me mister, I am just Roy’. To me it seemed 
impolite to call someone by his first name. Now I am used to that. Now we all call 
each other by our first names. But new Zambians coming into the office have to get 
used to this. We also make intercultural jokes, like putting ‘van der’ in front of 
everybody’s last name on the blackboard.84 
 
The Zambianisation of SNV at a professional level only started to take off in the mid-
1990s. 
 
 
Liberalisation and the Growing Influence of NGOs (1991-2005) 
 
Winning the multi-party election in 1991, the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy 
(MMD) under the leadership of former trade unionist Frederick Chiluba put an end to 
UNIP’s socialist experiment. MMD embarked on a policy of economic liberalisation 
and privatisation and it drastically downsised the civil service. Education and health 
services, provided for free under UNIP, now attracted a fee. Chiluba was opposed to 
‘paternalistic aid’ and did not want the state to be seen as the ‘benevolent father’. The 
emphasis was on self-help. These changes did not, however, bring the expected 
results, namely economic growth. Poverty and unemployment were on the increase. 
While the government was withdrawing from a number of sectors, the NGOs tried to 
fill the gap they left.85 The number of registered NGOs grew from 390 in 1993 to 
1500 in 1996.86 Dependency on the state, symptomatic of UNIP’s days, was replaced 
with dependency on local and international donor organisations. MMD introduced an 
agricultural policy aimed at the more successful semi-commercial farmers, which was 
implemented and backed financially by the donor community. 
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SNV Projects 
 
SNV followed the general trend of an idealistic voluntary organisation that had 
become professional: higher qualifications, more experience and better remuneration 
were all demanded. No longer known as volunteers or development associates, people 
working for SNV were now called advisors or consultants. Buzzwords from the 
private sector like marketing, management and clients found their way into the SNV 
vocabulary. While maintaining a good working relationship with DGIS, SNV was no 
longer executing its projects by the end of the 1990s.87  
Despite all these changes, SNV continued its historical involvement in local 
government within the newly introduced Provincial and District Development Support 
Programmes. It also remained involved in the projects which had been initiated in the 
1980s but that now had to be phased out. Policy changes included concentration on a 
selected number of districts and technical support to NGOs and community-based 
organisations regarding existing projects. The period could be defined by the word 
‘support’. With the closure of the Choma Museum project in 1997, SNV’s 
involvement in Southern Province came to an end. 
 
In 1999, SNV had nineteen different project activities in six ‘concentration’ districts, 
subdivided into three programmes: Local Government Support (LGS), Sustainable 
Economic Development (SED) and Civil Society Support (CSS). 
 
 
 
Province 
 
Activity88 
 
District 
 
Starting date 
Type of 
programme
Luapula District Planning Advice Nchelenge 1996 LGS 
 Fisheries Co-management Nchelenge 1997 LGS 
 Agricultural Advice Nchelenge 1997 SED 
 Groups/association Support Nchelenge 1992 CSS 
 Fisheries Co-management Samfya 1992 SED 
 Organising Samfya for  
Development 
Samfya 1998 CSS 
North-
Western 
 
Forest Management Advice 
 
Kabompo 
 
1998 
 
SED 
 RWHP Solwezi 1990 [?] VAR 
 District Planning Advice Mwinilunga 1993 LGS 
 Agricultural Advice Mwinilunga 1996 SED 
 ZDT Management Advise Zambezi 1991 CSS 
 YEPP/ZAYO Management  
Advice 
Zambezi 1996 CSS 
Western SAC Sesheke 1997 CSS 
 Cereal Banks Sesheke/Senanga 1996 SED 
 SeshekeNorth Development Mongu 1996 CSS 
 Liangati/CBNRM Sesheke 1999 SED 
 PPS Management Mongu 1998 CSS 
Nation District Strategic Planning 4 Districts 1998 LGS 
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What effect did the above-mentioned changes – such as economic liberalisation and a 
reduced civil service – have on the ongoing projects run by SNV, an organisation 
which traditionally worked closely with government? 
 
Zambezi Cooperative and Agricultural Project (ZCAP), North-Western Province 
 
The political change in 1991 marked the end of the cooperative movement. Aided by 
internal struggles within the cooperation itself, this led to the closure of the project in 
1992.89 In 1996, SNV directed its support towards the Zambezi Development Trust, 
an NGO that promotes self-sustainable development. SNV assisted by providing 
training and advice.  
 
Rural Water for Health Project, North-Western Province 
 
This project was badly affected by the political changes and economic decline. The 
most direct factor was the rising costs of inputs like fuel and cement, which are the 
major ingredients needed to construct boreholes and wells. Secondly, high inflation 
created unrest among the Zambian staff. Watching their incomes dwindle by the day, 
they became less motivated. The poor conditions of service at cooperating 
government departments bled them dry of people who were looking for greener 
pastures. Thirdly, the government did not provide financial support for the project 
from 1999 to the end of the project in 2001. An additional burden on the project was 
the issue of security: four SNV project vehicles were stolen between 1993 and 1994. 
When the project came to a stage where it had to be handed over to the 
government, SNV was forced to be innovative. It responded by working at 
strengthening the existing structures of the government departments and local 
communities. As the costs of drilling boreholes and making wells increased, the 
emphasis shifted to improving traditional water resources for communities that could 
not realistically afford modern technology.90 As a result, education about hygiene and 
the use of local wells and traditional water resources gained more prominence.91  
While the project as a whole was considered a success, SNV also realised that 
the performance of its successor, the Water Sanitation and Health Education 
(WASHE), would ‘to a large extent depend on the availability of external support 
from other cooperating partners and their relationship with existing government and 
private structures, to implement their programme activities and thus justify their 
existence to local communities’.92 
 
Masase Agricultural Project (MAP,), Western Province 
 
In response to farmers’ needs, project activities diversified in this period. Besides the 
original cattle development programme, SNV expanded into crop husbandry, natural 
resources and rangeland management, group development, and gender. Management 
remained in the hands of the Ministry of Agriculture, which assigned 21 field staff 
and 9 veterinary assistants to the project. In 1994, the project headquarters moved 
from Masase to Sesheke, the district capital, in order to benefit from the improved 
communications there.93 MAP was affected by the restructuring of the civil service, 
putting pressure on the number of extension workers. The government also stopped 
contributing to the project as stipulated in the contract. Again, SNV chose to 
emphasise the capacity of the local structures in the final phases. The final report, 
written by the Department of Agriculture, concluded that ‘the project can claim to 
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have achieved some successes in improving the food security level of a number of 
households … But the Project’s foremost “claim to fame” is having built its host 
organisation … and their staff. The programme was well integrated into that of its 
host organisation.’94 In 1998 the project was handed over and SNV pulled out. 
 
As a result of their experiences with MAP, SNV initiated new projects in Western 
Province, two of which are outlined below. 
 
Sesheke Advisory Centre (SAC), Western Province 
 
The realisation that the MAP project, as well as initiatives like the Cereal Banks 
projects,95 would not continue unless supported by a strong local institution led to the 
opening of Sesheke Advisory Centre. Staffed by two SNV advisors – one for 
management, monitoring and evaluation and the other for gender and training – the 
goals were formulated as follows: to enhance self-reliance through the provision of 
technical assistance in the field of institutional development, the empowerment of 
communities including men and with a special focus on women, and community 
organisations for relevant development actors operating in the district.96 Funded by 
DGIS for a period of three years, it faced many obstacles. The project closed in 2000 
but continued along similar lines in Mongu.  
 
People’s Participation Services (PPS), Mongu, Western Province 
 
Initiated by the FAO in 1984, the PPS aim to ‘build participatory and sustainable self-
help group structures in Western Province serving the interests of the rural poor, 
particularly women’. In 1994, it consisted of 2000 groups that were mainly involved 
in income-generating activities on and off the farm.97 In the mid-1990s PPS was 
transformed into an independent NGO and the SNV proposed working with them to 
integrate all its activities such as the Sesheke Advisory Centre, the Cereal Bank 
projects, etc. The Dutch Embassy financed this for a period of two years and SNV 
continued to assist with a part-time management advisory service for a further two-
year period.  
 
Projects in Luapula Province 
 
Despite challenges arising from the political and economic changes in Zambia, SNV’s 
involvement in Luapula Province showed a strong sense of continuity until the late 
1990s. Its policy centred on two issues: the establishment of efficient and effective 
District Councils (in line with the government’s policy of restructuring the civil 
service) and assistance for the Ministry of Fisheries in setting up fisheries co-
management systems like the Village Management Committees. The consequences of 
the reduction of Luapula’s fish stocks and the annual three-month fishing ban forced 
SNV to think about increasing local capabilities for monitoring the ban but also about 
training communities in how to organise alternative means of income generation 
during this particular period. SNV remained the major shareholder in the Kashikishi 
Ice Plant, which no longer operated as a cooperative but as a firm called ISABI 
Investments.  
 
In 2002, SNV unexpectedly pulled out of Luapula Province in spite of the fact that it 
was still supporting a number of projects that were known to be successful and even 
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though the province was mentioned in its long-term plans in 2002. As SNV itself did 
not provide a satisfactory answer as to the reasons for its withdrawal, it is not 
surprising that rumours surfaced. At this point only informed guesses can be made as 
to the reason for the decision. There was tension surrounding the sudden departure of 
an SNV advisor on Mwense District Council and this was aggravated by conflicts in 
the partisan politics of SNV’s cooperating partner in Samfya (see below). Luapula 
Province was the home of President Chiluba and this could have led to political 
pressures being put on SNV for local politicians to gain from the fishery industry. 
Existing conflicts between the SNV director and a Zambian programme officer in 
Luapula Province could also have contributed to its withdrawal from the province. In 
any case, SNV Mansa closed its offices for good and moved to Kasama in Northern 
Province. Former ISABI shareholders said ‘We were surprised … We don’t know 
whether it was conflict or a government problem or whatever but what we could see 
was just an economic consideration, perhaps they couldn’t handle so many offices in 
all areas.’98 And ‘I have no idea. I think it’s the government that can answer that. 
Maybe the contract expired or their term of office in Luapula.’99 A Samfya council 
employee said that ‘it was a sudden pull-out. That was for the co-funding activity, but 
maybe they were also strained somewhere on top.’100 A former Zambian Programme 
Officer in Luapula Province analysed the situation as follows:  
 
Because SNV did not offer any incentives, eventually the stakeholders … lost 
interest. It was also compounded by the fact that at that time the government was 
restructuring, so a lot of people who were put in those committees quite often ended 
up being transferred to other places. Eventually, all these projects closed down. And 
the new management decided they did not want Luapula, which shocked me, because 
if you look at the resources put there … and then you take a decision like that, I was 
extremely surprised.’101 
 
In 2000 SNV underwent an evaluation and a redirecting of its programme. The 
evaluators summarised their main criticism as follows:  
 
Today all elements of SNV-Zambia’s different phases can be found in its programme. 
Independent (SNV/other donor-sponsored) programme implementers, advisors, 
managers (and implementers) in ministries, local governments, NGOs, small 
enterprises, etc. sometimes with substantial additional facilities, sometimes not, 
sometimes with programme funding from SNV itself, sometimes with funding from 
third parties. As a result of the mix of approaches, SNV’s nature and identity are not 
clear, either to its clientele, or to its own personnel.102 
 
The result, in the eyes of the evaluators was that ‘all present and very diverse 
expectations by partners are based on some experiences with SNV (staff) and the 
general “donor” image of any organization from the North involved in (funding) 
development’.103 
 
Even though it was not clear yet what direction SNV would take at this point, it did 
signalled the end of project work. SNV published a new outline of its activities and in 
2002, it stated its aims as follows:  
 
SNV Zambia wants to contribute to poverty alleviation through the strengthening of 
local governance processes and economic development based on sustainable use of 
natural resources. It will do so through the facilitation of capacity building processes 
in local level institutions and organizations primarily in Western Province, North-
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Western Province and Luapula Province (1/5th of Zambia’s population). Dealing with 
gender and HIV/AIDS issues will form an integral part of SNV’s approach. SNV will 
provide advisory services and access to knowledge networks through professional 
development workers on demand in flexible, tailor-made arrangements. [author’s 
emphasis]104 
 
The themes show a certain degree of continuation in SNV’s traditional involvement: 
local governance, natural-resource management and private-sector development. This 
period was seen as one of SNV being in an advisory role. Since these developments 
have not crystallised and SNV is still undergoing many changes, it will be the task of 
a future historian to describe this period. 
 
 
Personal Experiences and Zambian Responses 
 
During this period, SNV staff cooperated with large numbers of civil servants at a 
district level. It is to their experiences that we now turn our attention. In Luapula 
Province people have positive memories of SNV even though there was frustration 
about its unexplained departure. And in spite of a riot in Samfya – the result of a 
violent imposition of the yearly fish ban on local fishermen – the SNV car, which had 
been handed over to the council after SNV’s departure, survived and can still be seen 
driving around. 
 
To the people who benefited directly from SNV’s intervention, the feeling is that of 
appreciation. People still talk fondly about it, while others express a desire for their 
return. Others still defend their legacy. An example is when the over-enthusiastic 
officers in Samfya ended up causing the deaths of three fishermen in an attempt to 
impose the fish ban. The district fishermen and sympathizers rose in riot and smashed 
infrastructure belonging to the fisheries department. The only thing they spared was 
an SNV vehicle!105 
 
In Mwense District they evaluate SNV’s presence as follows. ‘Mwense [council] was 
graded as the best in the province because of the support we received from SNV… 
Mwense was the only district with the capacity to plan and even manage the resources 
that were coming from the district.’106 In Samfya the district expressed misgivings 
about SNV’s decision to refrain from financial support. 
 
The problem we had was funding … the money they were giving us was very little. 
And maybe as Zambians, we were expecting a lot from them … We thought that after 
getting some training, we might extend those loans or grants but they only ended up 
providing knowledge and without capital it became very, very difficult.107 
 
This type of complaint was not only lodged by poorly paid civil servants but also by a 
businessmen, a former chairperson of ISABI Investments, explaining the collapse of 
the company as a result of the lack of capital SNV was putting in. ‘You buy your fish 
every day in the form of cash and there is no working capital … so you need this 
capital to keep running and you need a market for it which is 400 km away from the 
fishing area or freezing area.’108 
 
While people were generally satisfied with SNV’s contribution to the water and health 
sector in North-Western Province, their withdrawal from this particular project has 
left a big gap. 
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The government was supposed to take care of funding. SNV left a huge gap because 
the funding stopped. The wells ran dry, the government had no funds. The 
communities needed motivation. When something needed to be repaired, who would 
do it? A hand pump is only sold in Lusaka, costing millions of Kwacha. The 
communities could not raise that money. SNV left equipment like compressors and 
generators with Water Affairs. But Water Affairs just handed that equipment out to 
three districts. Less than 10% of the people that were trained are still working in 
water industry. In these three districts things are going well, in the other districts 
things are not as good.109 
 
It is interesting to note that despite the continued presence of SNV in Solwezi, its 
activities are not common knowledge among the general public, as can be seen in 
some of the following remarks: ‘I do not know much about them, except that they 
give agricultural inputs. Since I intend to go into agriculture, I will approach them’, 
and ‘I hear they help with loans for the disabled. Anyway, I see their cars everyday 
and know where their office is.’110 
 
Western Province has been called the 13th Province of the Netherlands, not only as a 
result of SNV’s presence but as a result of a high concentration of Dutch projects, as 
one Mongu resident observed. 
 
There were many Dutch people living here at that time. They even started an 
international school. It was mainly for Dutch people. When most of them left, the 
school continued. The feeling most people had was that the Dutch government had a 
liking for Western Province. Some even felt that it was being treated as a province of 
the Netherlands! And a number of our experts had the opportunity to be trained in the 
Netherlands.111 
 
Currently, SNV is one of the few Dutch organisations that has remained in Mongu 
and is still confronted with the legacy of large Dutch aid projects.112 The change from 
support to advisory role in this context is more difficult to explain. The phasing out or 
withdrawing from long-term projects has caused resentment among the local 
population. As one SNV driver commented:  
 
In the beginning I was working for SNV projects like the Masese agriculture project, 
the Sesheke advisory centre and Tango. First these projects were sponsored by SNV, 
but now they stand on their own. The people were very disappointed. Some people 
came up to me asking why SNV had left. So I went up to the team leader to ask why 
they had left the projects on their own. He gave me an explanation. I understand and 
agree with the decision but I find it very difficult for the people. Even today, they 
don’t understand why SNV has left and what capacity building does.113 
 
A politician and local businessman in Sesheke, highly appreciate SNV’s long 
presence as opposed to most other organisations, felt that it was unrealistic to expect 
that the infrastructure be handed over to the government and the local population 
maintain it. In addition, the people targeted for training were civil servants who have 
since been transferred or have passed away.114 The failure of this handover, which 
should have contributed to a feeling of empowerment, had the opposite effect: people 
know that is possible to improve their livelihoods but are made to feel incapable of 
doing it themselves.115 
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The Zambianisation of SNV brought to the fore the inequalities between expatriates 
and local staff, namely a two-tier salary system and differences in housing allowances 
and the provision of social security. The first Zambian programme officer in Luapula 
Province was a former civil servant with a PhD in agronomy. Being well-educated, he 
complained that in 1995 SNV ‘was pretending to be a professional organisation … the 
mentality was still that of volunteers except for the salaries of the Dutch staff.’116 
A similar complaint about differences in status came from another Zambian 
professional: 
 
When I came as a programme officer, I was the only one not entitled to 
accommodation because I was based in Lusaka. All the Dutch operating in Lusaka, 
however, got accommodation through SNV. And so did the Zambian DAs operating 
outside Lusaka. That was very unfair.117 
 
Again, vehicles played a prominent part in the distrust between Zambians and Dutch 
SNV personnel. 
 
The director would quite openly make statements like ‘he knew people were abusing 
vehicles’ … they [the Dutch] were always thinking that people were abusing things. 
So there wasn’t a collegial relationship which was quite unfortunate.118 
 
There were a lot of difficulties within the organisation. There were many differences 
like for example about transport. According to the Dutch we didn’t need a car for a 
project, while I thought we did need a car. It depended on the field director to what 
extent they were going to listen to a Zambian. One was very friendly and the other 
was much more complicated.119 
 
This kind of tension was picked up by the evaluators in 2000 who commented that: 
 
SNV vehicles are seen but activities not shared. SNV was seen as to be operating in 
isolation. It should attend more meetings, call on local leadership … SNV Zambia is 
seen as having a credibility gap between itself and its (some) clients because the 
organisation gives the impression that it does not trust some of its partners.120 
  
Within the organisation itself, the atmosphere changed. SNV as a family concept was 
gone, as is stated by a Zambian member of staff: 
 
The family culture that SNV used to have was an atmosphere in which everybody 
knew everybody. We knew each other’s partners, children, we had annual meetings 
and the organisation was much smaller. Now we just work from eight to five and that 
is it. The social atmosphere has gone. The Dutch and the Zambians used to be one big 
culture together; there was a lot of interaction going on outside office hours. I find 
that completely different nowadays.121 
 
A driver confirms this: 
 
For me there are two SNVs. And I prefer the first one! In the old SNV, you would 
have dinner at SNVers houses when you were visiting other areas. Things have 
become more detached at SNV.122 
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In the late 1990s, SNV rapidly turned into a multinational organisation, not only 
employing more Zambians but also people from all over Africa. While recognising 
the need for change, they notice negative aspects of this process too. 
 
The mixed character of the office is good because it shows faith in the capacity of 
Zambia, but on the other hand uncertainty is being created by these changes. Fear 
exists because of change within this organisation, also the reduction of Dutch people 
within the offices creates uncertainty. 123 
 
In the beginning when I started working for SNV we had more Dutch people. There 
were four in Sesheke, two in Senanga and one in Mongu in 1995. Zambians become 
suspicious because fewer and fewer whites are coming in. To us that is a sign that the 
organisation is not doing very well! We don’t trust each other!124 
 
A similar complaint comes from an external consultant who claimed that there is a 
level of corruption and nepotism in Zambianised organisations. In order for him to get 
a consultancy job he has to share his earnings:  
 
Local people want cuts in these evaluations. So people like myself don’t get jobs for 
they say how do we ask Gilbert to part with 50% of his earnings? That is bad, not 
only for myself but also for the perception of the organisation. We should localise 
personnel and keep them in the culture of that organisation.125 
 
A question that can be posed in relation to SNV Zambianisation relates to the general 
character of the organisation: did the changeover of staff make SNV more Zambian or 
African in outlook? According to a present member of staff, SNV can still be 
identified as being Dutch: 
 
… at the end of the day it remains a Dutch organisation. For me the physical presence 
of a Dutch person gives immediate evidence of perhaps the Dutch origin of the 
organisation. But it is not the physical presence of a Dutch person, but what the 
organization represents. What is Dutch, it is the idea of equality, of recognizing the 
rights of the individuals, also of reducing inequalities. And I find this already in the 
way our board is structured. Previously there were three board members. There is 
always negotiation, trying to agree, trying to get a win-win situation, trying to find 
consensus. That consensus-building culture, I find that typically Dutch. A culture 
which is not imposing, there is no hierarchy, that’s what I find also in the approach to 
development, this is what we try to achieve. To look at the individual as having the 
perspective of quality and respect, at individual level. 126 
 
While not shying away from discussing internal policies, inequalities and directions, 
SNV always took a conformist stand towards Zambia’s government, never 
challenging its status quo. Ferguson noted: 
 
 that the conceptual problematic of development has served, in concrete instances and 
thought specifiable mechanisms, as what I have termed an ‘anti-politics machine’, 
systemically misrecognition and depoliticizing understandings of the lives and 
problems of people living in...127 
 
Some openly criticise SNV’s apolitical attitude:  
 
In the process of Zambia becoming poor, not all agreed to that route. There were 
alternative routes but those routes were not supported even by independent 
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organizations … part of development is to invest in innovative way of doing things. 
You also have organisations like SNV who are doing projects all over the world. 
There is no transcontinental, trans-country sharing of experience.128  
 
Partisan politics in the 1990s resulted in a direct confrontation between SNV and Rev. 
Betlem Chonde, who was working for SNV’s partner organisation Organising Samfya 
for Development. Chonde was accused of campaigning for an opposition party using 
SNV resources. The conclusion was that despite the fact that ‘there is no evidence 
indicating that Rev. Chonde has misused SNV/OSD funds or transport for political 
activities, or used the SNV/OSD umbrella to further his political interest [UPND], he 
is not allowed to pursue his political campaign in Samfya district.’129 The fact that 
Chonde was campaigning in an area that was heavily dominated by the ruling MMD 
government might have increased the political pressure on SNV. 
 
 
Consequences and Memory of SNV’s Involvement in Zambia 
 
Most people have become cynical about the impact of development activities and are 
still looking for the answer to Zambia’s perceived problems. Is micro-level input more 
beneficial than large-scale projects? Should development workers only advise or is 
hands-on cooperation more productive? Is the development sector to blame for 
misguided development ideologies or are Zambians just too passive? Ferguson 
considers these expressions of insecurity as a part of a general trend: 
 
There is a real break with the certainties and expectations that made a development 
era possible. The “rolling back” of the state, the abandonment of the goal of 
industrialization, the commitment to what are euphemistically called “market forces” 
and “private enterprise”, and the shattering of expectations for economic convergence 
with the West, all come together to create a very real end, at least at the level of 
perceptions and expectations, of at least the grander versions of development projects 
in Africa.130 
 
These uncertainties are especially true for those who experienced Zambia’s radical 
changes: from a relatively wealthy, donor-independent country where government 
was the actor for change and development to a poor, donor-dependent country with an 
ineffective government. Former SNV volunteers have become more cynical about 
development organisations like SNV as they have witnessed little progress. At the 
same time, they express some nostalgia about the early period in which volunteers 
were motivated, not by income or status but by idealism. This, in their view, is in 
sharp contrast tp the current situation in which development workers are well paid. 
The crucial question is how to measure the impact of development work? Only 
with the professionalisation of development work were attempts made to study the 
effectiveness of development activities, mainly through evaluation reports. But 
evaluators themselves have cast doubt on the possibilities of measuring a non-
technical intervention like gender, which is aimed at behavioural change. 
 
Although quite a number of gender related workshops have been organised over the 
past years, it is impossible to say what effect this had on the participation of villagers, 
both men and women, in project activities …. the end of the road to gender equality is 
barely visible and continuous efforts will have to be made by the project.131 
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One evaluator observed that as a result of this vagueness, workshops are often 
counted as tangible results. Instead of meetings being just a means of achieving the 
objective, they have become the objective itself.132  
What is more interesting for this particular study is the way in which people 
reviewed their own impact, especially those SNV volunteers who continued their stay 
in Zambia and after 20 years (or more) of residency have acquired a local perspective. 
They have the advantage of having experienced long-term developments in Zambia 
and have had the opportunity to revisit their projects. Most of them emphasise the 
shortcomings of their past SNV activities. With the benefit of hindsight, they can, for 
instance, now see that the infrastructure they put in place could never, realistically, 
have been maintained by the local population, especially in the context of economic 
decline.133 
Both Zambians and SNV volunteers share the idea that at an individual level 
the cooperation and training was beneficial. However, the structural impact of 
development work on the basis of these relatively short-term interventions has been 
questioned.134 
 
In reviewing the material, it seems that the most far-reaching and long-term 
consequences of SNV’s activities in Zambia are the unintended ones. SNV has left a 
group of successful entrepreneurs in Zambia. A number of former SNV volunteers 
(from the 1960s to early 1980s) took the opportunity to remain in Zambia, either as a 
result of a local marriage or due to business opportunities. Most of them are active in 
the agricultural sector: rose-growing for export, meat processing, tobacco processing, 
farming and coffee exports are all popular amongst this group of former volunteers.135 
One nurse is still active in the healthcare sector, though she married a commercial 
farmer, and an anthropologist/artist continues his involvement in Choma museum. 
Not all are convinced of their effectiveness as development workers but all agree that 
this early experience benefited them later in their interaction with Zambians in the 
private sector. 
 
I believe SNV is an organisation from which you can learn a lot, how you deal with 
the local population. It has benefited me a lot. You learn not to be afraid to get in 
contact with people from a different culture. At the preparation course you learned 
how to respect other people and how you perhaps can be the first one to start a 
discussion … The big difference between my work now and then is the economic 
approach.136 
 
They also realised that development workers or consultants stayed too limited a 
period of time to see if people actually people benefited from their intervention.137 
Former volunteers occasionally visit their projects to see what has happened since. 
Did these visits confirm the idea that Zambia has become a ‘graveyard of enthusiastic 
projects’?138  
Dirk de Jaeger who worked in Zambia in the 1960s revisited his project first in 
1978 and then again in 2000.139 During his first visit he noticed that: 
 
… inhabitants somewhat resented that such a helpful team had departed … the 
departure of the team had even led to conflicts with the local headman who was 
accused of not having been active enough to keep the team in the area…140 
 
 Looking back, de Jaeger believes that the project was unrealistic from the beginning 
as there was very limited potential in this isolated area. In 2000, he visited the area 
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again and was surprised to still find remnants of the project. Interestingly, Willem 
Berentz, also a former SNV volunteer, started a farm in the same district and serves as 
living proof that commercial farming in this remote area is indeed possible. 
Witkamp is still actively involved in the Choma museum though DGIS and 
SNV pulled out in 1997. Having overcome many hurdles over the course of time, the 
project has finally become a success story. 
 
The project actually succeeded, against all the odds, accidentally succeeded. Also 
because I stayed. This year we have already sold 60 million kwacha worth of baskets, 
made by 400 women ... In the end SNV and DGIS can be quite happy with the 
outcome. We are a tourist attraction; fifteen hundred people visit this place every 
month.141 
 
Some projects completely disappeared with the pulling-out of the donor organisation, 
as Pritchett observed in Mwinilunga:  
 
Possessing both Land Rovers and a large truck, which frequently shuttled between 
Mwinilunga and Solwezi, the project provided a prime transportation link. Farmers 
who participated in the scheme had access to a wide range of commodities generally 
scarce in Mwinilunga. They could also pass on information about conditions in 
Solwezi market and sometimes managed to transport their kin’s commodities there… 
Once the Dutch supervisors and their vehicles left, however, all the advantages 
disappeared. Farmers found themselves isolated … on the periphery of the flow of 
information, goods and services. The remnants of the project quickly faded away.142 
 
More such unintended results can be found. The above-mentioned evaluations reveal 
that in some instances the SNV projects had long-term effects that were only noticed 
after a period of time. It is therefore all the more astonishing to note that SNV has not 
kept a record of its long-term participation in Zambia. All the documents quoted in 
this chapter came from the Netherlands Embassy archives in Lusaka and most of these 
records will be destroyed in the coming years. While there is evidence of an SNV 
archive until the late 1990s, nobody can confirm why it no longer exists or explain 
why records are not kept for longer than three years.  
Keeping archives does not only benefit the historian but also serves other 
important purposes as well: administrative continuation, the creation, expansion and 
maintenance of networks, background information, and data for presentations and 
reports that can serve to enhance accountability. When former SNV volunteer Nina 
Atkins found employment with SNV in the 1990s, no record was found to testify to 
her previous contract with the organisation. She had to resubmit all her papers. 
Liswaniso who worked for SNV in the 1990s was never aware that the well-known 
Muyoyeta preceded her. A former SNV field director had difficulty remembering the 
reasons for Western Province being a ‘concentration’ province for the Dutch 
government and SNV.143 In 1999, the SNV field director erroneously held that up to 
1989, SNV used to work in seven provinces and that its programme was extremely 
diversified. She ended her speech by saying that from the steps SNV was taking ‘it 
was clear that SNV was learning from the past’.144 
What could be the reasons for SNV’s lack of institutional memory in Zambia? 
Back in 1984, Wood and Vokes were already suggesting that: 
 
With the turnover of staff … it is difficult to achieve the necessary continuity for this 
understanding and sensitivity … improving institutional memory is one solution to 
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the problem, but it is a poor substitute for the sensitivity and understanding which can 
only be built up over time through personal experience.145 
 
Muyoyeta also blames the high turnover of staff: 
 
… organisations like SNV people come and go so much. So within a short time, their 
memories go. So within a short time I lost contact with the organisation and moved 
on to other things … Brenda (Liswaniso) came with SNV ten years after me. But the 
strange thing is that I asked her if she knew that I had worked for SNV and she said 
no. There was absolutely no memory of that. She was really shocked when I told her, 
because there was no memory of that within the organisation. People move around so 
much in these organisations.146 
 
Witkamp links the short stay of SNV staff with a lack of accountability: 
 
People are never confronted with the consequences of their behaviour ... the salary 
arrives in the bank anyway, there are air tickets, if you become sick you will be 
repatriated, your children get their education ... And after two or three years you get 
out of it again. Than you get a replacement who says: ‘Gee, what a strange thing Jan 
did here!’ But Jan is already gone, posted to Bolivia, doing something with coffee! As 
a result, an SNV person will never belong to Zambian society. He/she remains an 
exotic person, who drives a car, sits at a computer and writes reports.147 
 
One reason for the hesitancy about keeping SNV’s memory alive that was not directly 
stated by any of those interviewed could be the desire to make a clean break with the 
past. This tendency comes not solely as a result of bad experiences in certain areas in 
Zambia but also as what SNV staff conceive to be a total change of character in the 
organisation. Today’s SNV is seen as being entirely unconnected with the SNV of the 
past. However, despite its new course, SNV cannot deny people, both Zambian 
citizens and Dutch residents, a memory of 40 years SNV in Zambia.  
It proved difficult to reconstruct local memories of SNV in the rural areas, 
probably as a result of the comings and goings of so many organisations and the 
transfer of civil servants – the SNV’s local counterparts. All the same, one can 
observe a strong memory of the organisation in the places where SNV was operational 
over a long period of time. People in the rural areas of Sesheke District still suggest 
the return of SNV, as it is the only organisation which stayed with them for such a 
long time.148 A former Programme Officer states in this context that: ‘I think in the 
areas that SNV works in they are well known … but in those areas where it doesn’t 
work, they don’t know SNV, it’s just like any other programme. … Except new 
people. People who were there 10 to 15 years ago knew what they were doing.’149 
This was also the finding of the research assistant who travelled through Luapula and 
North-Western Province:  
 
The overwhelming majority of the people who have heard of SNV are those who 
have had contact with it. Knowledge about it is scanty on the ground among ordinary 
residents.150 
 
Those who worked closely with SNV as employees or counterparts still have fond 
memories of their cooperation, and hope that SNV will change its current policy and 
return to the kind of organisation they remember so well. A consultant comments that, 
unlike other organisations, SNV has a long track record in Zambia. 
 
 30
They have a lot of experience and in a way think they are a leading organisation. 
SNV would be in the same category as some of these Norwegian, Swedish 
organisations. At least, there is an element of learning which you don’t find in 
American and British organisations.151 
 
Records are kept for the sake of accountability of past deeds but also for the simple 
reason that people who had close contact with SNV have an undeniable memory of its 
continued presence in Zambia. This memory can also be used to SNV’s advantage: to 
prevent the creation of untruths and myths and to network with successful former 
SNV volunteers. 
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Interviews and discussions 
 
by Anne-Lot Hoek (a), Besa Mwaba (m), Marja Hinfelaar (h) 
 
1. Godfrey Azuza, Solwezi, 28 July 2005 (a) 
2. Nina Atkins, Monze, 14 January 2006 (h) 
3. Bas Beek, Lusaka, 24 January 2006 (h) 
4. Malambo Blann, Solwezi, 28 July 2005 (a) 
5. Chansa Chansa, 23 November 2005 (m) 
6. Mwimanj Ndota Chellah, Choma, 3 August 2005 (a) 
7. Dr Webster Chikampa, Sesheke, 11 November 2005 (h) 
8. Clara Chipoya, Solwezi, 23 November 2005 (m) 
9. Paul Chulu, Mansa, 29 September 2005 (m) 
10. Sr. Engelbergus, Mongu, 25 August 2005 (a) 
11. Willem van de Grinten, Lusaka, 13 January 2006 (h) 
12. Dik Ijf‚ Lusaka, 30 May 2005 (a)  
13. Makuni Jairo, Sesheke, 12 November 2005 (h) 
14. Henry Kaira, Solwezi, 28 July 2005 (a) 
15. Meshias Kabimba and other village people, outside Solwezi, 29 July 2005 (a) 
16. Fred Kafumbe, Mansa, 30 September 2005 (m) 
17. Ackim Kalembo, Solwezi, 29 July 2005 (a) 
18. Adrian Katema, District Planning Officer, Mwense, 3 October 2005 (m) 
19. Eugene van Kemenade, Mongu, 23 July 2005 (a) 
20. Tomas Killodamo, Solwezi, 29 July 2005 (a) 
21. Fred Kosamu , Samfya 27 September 2005 (m) 
22. Henry Kaira, Solwezi, 28 July 2005 (a) 
23. Arie de Kwaaisteniet, Lusaka, 31 May 2005 (a) 
24. Kusiyo Mbikos Lewanika, Mongu, 22 July 2005 (a) 
25. Clement T. Lishibi, Sesheke, 11 November 2005 (h) 
26. Brenda Liswaniso, Lusaka, 3 June 2005 (a) 
27. Renee Lourens, Lusaka, 26 May 2005 (a) 
28. Willem Lublinkhof, Mazabuka, 2 June 2005 and Lusaka, 2 August 2005 (a) 
29. Michael Mabenga, Sesheke, 11 November 2005 (h) 
30. Sinjan Mukutulu, Sesheke, 11 November 2005 (h) 
31. Sibongile Mauye, Solwezi, 29 July 2005 (a) 
32. George Mbangula, driver SNV, Mongu, 27 July 2005 (a) 
33. Eric de Milliano, Leiden, 27 October 2005 (a) 
34. Dr Gilbert Mudenda, consultant, Lusaka, 27 October 2005 (h) 
35. John Mulamfu, Mongu, 25 July 2005 (a) 
36. Kikilwa Mundiya, Mongu, 22 July 2005 (a) 
37. Godfrey Mutokoma, SNV Lusaka, Lusaka-Choma, 3 August 2005 (a) 
38. Lucy Muyoyeta, Lusaka, 31 May 2005 (a) 
39. Inos Mwale, Lusaka, Zambia, 27 May 2005 (a) 
40. David Mwansa, Mansa, 1 October 2005 (m) 
41. Maurice Ndobela, Lusaka, 1 June 2005 (a) 
42. Charlton Nzie, SNV Mongu, 25 July 2005 (a) 
43. Shimon Patel, former chairman ISABI, Mansa, 29 September 2005 (m) 
44. Ernest Phiri, Solwezi, 29 July 2005 (a) 
45. Carla and Jacob Schoemaker, Lusaka, 25 May 2005 (a) 
46. Dr John Siame, Lusaka, 20 September 2005 (h) 
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47. Daisy Sikateni, Mansa, 30 September 2005 (m) 
48. Allen Sinkamba, Sesheke, 12 November 2005 (h) 
49. Petra Staal, Lusaka, 8 November 2005 (h) 
50. Gerrit Struif, Lusaka, 3 June 2005 (a) 
51. Aldert van de Vinne, Lusaka, 24 May 2005 (a) 
52. Bert Witkamp, Choma, 3 August 2005 (a) 
53. Meindert Witvliet, Amsterdam, 1 April 2005 (a) 
54. Wim Wouters, Lusaka, 1 November 2005 (h) 
55. Tebuho Yubai, Lusaka, 6 June 2005 (a) 
56. Wim Zevenbergen, The Hague, 3 March 2005 (a) 
57. Mutinta Zulu, Lusaka, 27 May 2005 (a) 
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